Actual democratic societies often bear little resemblance to the visions of what a democracy should look like that are offered by political philosophers and civics textbooks. This incongruity prompts two questions that drive much of my research:
First, to what extent must we adjust visions of what democracy should look like to account for how democracies actually work (or fail to work)?
Second, how can we better approximate our visions of what democracy should look like given the limits of human reason and motivation, and the realities of political life?
I am currently working on a new project on political polarization, and on an ongoing project on regulatory governance.
"Political irrationality, Utopianism, and Democratic Theory." (forthcoming) Politics, Philosophy & Economics.
"The Fact of Unreasonable Pluralism." (forthcoming) Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
"The need for feasible compromises on conscientious objection: response to Card." (2019) (co-authored with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong) Journal of Medical Ethics. Published Online First: 14 March 2019.
"Democratic Theory for a Market Democracy: The Problem of Merriment and Diversion When Regulators and Regulated Meet." (2018) (co-authored with Wayne Norman) Journal of Social Philosophy, special issue on "Market Governance," 49(4): 536-563.
"Democracy Isn't That Smart (But We Can Make it Smarter): On Landemore's Democratic Reason." (2017) Episteme 14(2): 161-175.
"How to Allow Conscientious Objections in Medicine While Protecting Patient Rights." (2017) (co-authored with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong) Cambridge Quarterly of Medical Ethics 26(1): 121-131.