Actual democratic societies often bear little resemblance to the normative visions of democracy offered by political philosophers. This incongruity prompts two questions that drive much of my research:
(1) To what extent must we adjust our normative visions of democracy to account for how democracies actually work (or fail to work)?
(2) How can we better approximate our democratic ideals given both the limits of human reason and motivation, and the realities of political life?
“Democratic Theory for a Market Democracy: The Problem of Merriment and Diversion When Regulators and Regulated Meet.” (forthcoming) (with Wayne Norman) Journal of Social Philosophy special issue on Market Governance.
"Democracy Isn't that smart (but we can make it smarter): On Landemore's Democratic Reason." (2017) Episteme 14(2):161-175.
"How to Allow Conscientious Objection in Medicine While Protecting Patient Rights." (2017) (with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong) Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26(1):120-231.
“Empiricism and normative ethics: What do the biology and the psychology of morality have to do with ethics?” (2014) (with Owen Flanagan, Stephen Martin, and Gordon Steenbergen) Behaviour (Special Issue: Evolved Morality: The Biology and Philosophy of Human Conscience edited by Frans de Waal, Patricia Churchland, Telmo Pievani, and Stefano Parmigiani) 151 (2-3): 208-228.
“A tale of two processes: Categorization accuracy and attentional learning dissociate with imperfect feedback.” (2011) (with Caitlyn McColeman and Mark Blair) Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society: 1661-1666. A paper from my undergraduate days in Simon Fraser University's Cognitive Science Lab.